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CREATING THE 1980S MARITIME STR ATEGY
AND IMPLIC ATIONS FOR TODAY
John T. Hanley, Jr.

W

hile important differences exist, the first decade of the twenty-first
century paralleled the 1970s for the Department of Defense and the
U.S. Navy. U.S. armed forces were embroiled in extended and expensive counterinsurgency wars. American military equipment was growing old, budgets were
tight, and extended projections called for significant decreases in the nation’s
armed forces, just as the main prospective military adversary was both rapidly
modernizing and expanding its forces, particularly its navy. “From 1962 to 1972,
the navy had programmed the construction of 42 ships per year, but between
1968 and 1975 only 12 ships, or less than a third as many per year, were programmed. In 1975, given the age of ships already at sea, and the navy-expected
service life for a warship of 25–30 years, the service anticipated retiring about 4
percent of the active fleet each year.”1 The Soviets were extending their defensive
perimeter from two to three thousand kilometers.2 Today, the Chinese suggest
extending their defensive perimeter from the “first island chain,” enclosing
the East and South China Seas, to the second, bounded by the Marianas, three
thousand kilometers from the Chinese coast.3 In the 1970s, the United States
questioned its own ability to fight forward, defend allies, and achieve objectives
—as many defense analysts and many in the Navy do now.
The maritime strategy of the 1980s rapidly changed the 1970s Navy’s narrative
and perspective. In the early 1980s the Navy came to believe that it could play a
decisive role in a global war with the Soviet Union. Using sensitive intelligence on
Soviet operations, plans, and military science, a newly created group of upwardly
mobile officers working directly for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and
interacting with the Navy leadership and fleet commands employed operations
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analysis and war gaming to create novel operational concepts and campaigns
to defeat the Soviet strategy. The operational concepts that became William A.
Owens’s “system of systems” and that Arthur K. Cebrowski branded “networkcentric warfare” provided underpinnings for this turnaround.4 These concepts
involving close cooperation among Navy, Marines, Air Force, and allies, akin to
today’s “Air-Sea Battle,” were key to victory in the maritime theaters.5 Revisiting
the creation of the 1980s strategy suggests opportunities for dealing with the
antiaccess/area-denial challenges presented by China and others today.
THE SPIRIT OF THE U.S. NAVY IN THE ’70S:
WRINGING OF THE HANDS
“The accelerating obsolescence of the U.S. Navy since the end of World War II as
opposed to the impressive growth of and modernization of the Soviet Navy during the same period” was in the forefront of Admiral Elmo “Bud” Zumwalt’s mind
when he became Chief of Naval Operations in 1970.6 American and Soviet maritime development were “asymmetrical” in a number of fundamental respects:
• The United States was a “world island” long experienced in the use of the
seas, but the Soviet Union was a self-sustaining land power.
• The Soviets were able to “protect their most important client states or attack all but one of its most likely enemies without going to sea,” while “the
political interests and commitments of the United States require[d] that it be
capable of having a large military influence overseas.”
• The U.S. Navy had been at its largest at the end of World War II and was now
retiring large numbers of aging ships, while the Soviet navy, having been
destroyed, was rebuilding.
• The Soviets had an advantage in naval cruise missiles.
• The Soviets had only limited access to the seas but were increasing their
operations in the Mediterranean, in the Persian Gulf, in the Caribbean, and
around Africa.
• The Soviet navy controlled land-based, long-range aircraft armed with cruise
missiles, as well as merchant ships and fishing fleets.
• The U.S. Navy was emphasizing power projection rather than sea control, in
response to the demands of the Vietnam War.
• The U.S. services’ budgets were limited, as was their control over roles and
missions.
All these factors led, in Zumwalt’s view, to an unbalanced fleet with a rapidly
diminishing capability to deal with the Soviet navy.7 Zumwalt estimated “that
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/4
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as of 1 July 1970 the United States had a 55 percent chance of winning a major
conventional war at sea, and was heading toward a 45 percent chance as of 1 July
1971, and [a] considerably smaller one than that by 1 July 1972 if budget levels
under discussion were maintained.”8
Nuclear arms control agreements were driven by “Henry Kissinger’s world
view: that the dynamics of history are on the side of the Soviet Union; that before
long the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] will be the only superpower
on earth and that the United States will be an also-ran; that a principal reason this
will happen is that Americans have neither the stamina or the will to do the hard
things they would have to do to prevent it from happening.”9
On coming to office in 1977, President Jimmy Carter directed in Presidential
Review Memorandum 10 “that a comprehensive examination be made of overall U.S. national strategy and capabilities.”10 The review generated “alternative
integrated military strategies,” all of which emphasized Central Europe. The
strategies planned on losing territory but holding for thirty days. Strategies to
take territory back were deemed unaffordable. The strategies counted on Soviet
hostility with China to pin Soviet forces in Asia. They contained no viable approaches for conflict termination. While they acknowledged options for conflicts
outside Europe, they did not analyze these. The Joint Chiefs of Staff footnoted
in several places that “adoption of any of these [alternative integrated military
strategies] contains the high risk of the loss of Western Europe or early initiation
of a nuclear response, should deterrence fail.”11 The plans called for swinging U.S.
forces, particularly naval forces, from the Pacific to Europe, though there was a
question whether they would arrive within the thirty days needed to stop a Soviet
advance.12
Secretary of Defense Brown seemed to be trying to bring the huge defense budget
under control by strengthening NATO’s land and air forces through reduction of the
navy’s role and budget. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and
Evaluation, Russell Murray, was quoted as saying that [the Defense Department’s]
short-term objective was to ensure that NATO would not be overwhelmed in the first
few weeks of a blitzkrieg war, and he advised that the navy should be concerned with
local contingencies outside the NATO area.13

Further,
In February 1978, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III, testified to the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee that in the event of
war with the Soviet Union the U.S. Navy could not maintain complete superiority in
the western Pacific or protect vital commercial shipping to allies in Japan and Korea.
As Holloway later recalled in his memoir, “Supporting NATO was our first priority.
With the continuing decline in our naval force levels, we had become a one-ocean
navy.”14
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The assessment of the 1978–79 Military Balance, produced by the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, was that NATO no longer had the capacity to exert
sea control in all areas vital to the alliance at the start of a NATO–Warsaw Pact
war.15
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS STRATEGIC STUDIES GROUP
In July 1981 the CNO, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, established a Center for
Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, with Robert J. Murray, who was
just leaving his position as Under Secretary of the Navy, at its helm and a Strategic
Studies Group (SSG) as its centerpiece. As commander of the Seventh Fleet in
1976–77, “Hayward became aware that it was not until the three-star level that a
senior officer was faced with having to make strategic decisions.”16 He “had two
parallel interests: to create a core of future naval leaders who were well versed in
the role of naval forces in national policy and strategy and to reestablish the Naval
War College, in everyone’s view, as the pinnacle for education in naval strategic
thinking.”17 As CNO, Hayward “wanted to break away from the program planning process that seemed to dominate so much of the navy’s thinking and to focus
on a realistic and effective strategy for fighting at sea.”18 As commander of the
Pacific Fleet he had initiated a “Sea Strike” concept for employing naval forces in
the Pacific in the event of war with the Soviets.19
Hayward wanted to form a group made up of extremely capable and successful
naval officers with recent fleet experience, and who themselves would be the future
leaders of the navy, to work toward this new strategy. . . . In selecting the first group
of officers for the Strategic Studies Group, Hayward received nominations from a
wide variety of sources within the navy, and then he personally reviewed the service
jackets of candidates, spending hours on them in an attempt to find the men he felt
would certainly be the best future choices for flag rank.20

The first SSG consisted of six naval officers (commanders and captains) and
two Marines (a lieutenant colonel and a colonel), assigned to the Center for
Naval Warfare Studies for a year as “CNO Fellows.”21 This group had no template for how to conduct its studies. Its members spent a considerable amount
of time talking to the commanders of fleets and unified commands (i.e., in this
connection, theater commands, today realigned and known as “unified combatant commands”), well-known academics, and former senior defense officials to
familiarize themselves with the strategic context and issues facing the Navy. Each
of the officers chose a topic of interest relating to practical war fighting. They
tested their collective ideas as they developed them in a series of war games. Of
the individual efforts, a P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft pilot, Captain Dan
Wolkensdorfer (who was selected for rear admiral while with the SSG), worked
with a submariner, Commander Bill Owens, on a “combined arms” approach to
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/4

NWC_Spring2014Review.indb 14

4

2/14/14 1:08 PM

Hanley: Creating the 1980s Maritime Strategy and Implications for Today

HA N L E Y

15

antisubmarine warfare. Commander Art Cebrowski focused on the air campaign
in NATO’s northern region. These efforts, informed by high-quality intelligence,
coalesced into a campaign and strategy aimed at defeating the Soviet naval strategy in a way that was to affect the fundamental Soviet approach to war.22
THE SSG’S MARITIME STRATEGY
One of the important findings of our Strategic Studies (Review) Group at
[the Naval War College] and the [CNO Executive Panel] folks here, during their fleet visits and discussions with navy leadership, is that there is
a great deal of confusion about strategies and analysis relating to force
acquisition and strategy for winning wars. Much of the analysis done is
more related to the first than the latter.
ADMIRAL WILLIAM SMALL, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, 1982

In the Pentagon, the focus of the Navy Staff was on programming and budgeting.23 The SSG focused its efforts instead on war fighting with existing forces. The
SSG’s approach was to identify strengths that U.S. and allied forces could apply
against Soviet weaknesses in the maritime theaters to attack the Soviet Union’s
strategic sensitivities in a global war. The first SSG concentrated its analysis on
the Soviet Northern Fleet and NATO’s northern region as presenting the greatest
leverage for NATO. Soviet sensitivities to the “correlation of forces,” particularly
nuclear, and “combat stability” became targets for the SSG’s strategy.
Though a forthcoming new national intelligence estimate on the Soviet’s naval
strategy had not yet been published, the SSG had access to the intelligence on
which it was based as it was analyzed. Key findings were these:
Within the Soviets’ overall wartime strategy, however, the primary initial tasks of the
navy remain:
• To deploy and provide protection for ballistic missile submarines in preparation
for and conduct of strategic and theater nuclear strikes.
• To defend the USSR and its allies from strikes by enemy ballistic missile submarines and aircraft carriers.
Accomplishment of these tasks would entail attempts to control all or portions of the
Kara, Barents, and northern Norwegian and Greenland seas, the seas of Japan and
Okhotsk, and the Northwest Pacific Basin, and to conduct sea-denial operations beyond those areas to about 2,000 kilometers from Soviet territory. We believe that virtually all of the Northern and Pacific Fleets’ available major surface combatants and
combat aircraft and some three-quarters of their available attack submarines would
be committed initially to operations in these waters. Other initial naval wartime tasks
are: support of ground force operations in the land theaters of military operations
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(including countering naval support to enemy operations in peripheral areas such as
Norway), and some interdiction of Western sea lines of communication (SLOCs).
. . . We expect these requirements—particularly the need to counter Western units
armed with the new Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile—will drive the Soviets to
expand the area in which their navy would initially deploy the bulk of its Northern
and Pacific Fleet forces for sea-control/sea-denial operations—possibly out to 3,000
kilometers from Soviet territory.24

Analysts at the Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, who had been
studying Soviet naval writings for decades had come to the conclusion that the
Soviets would use most of their naval forces to provide “combat stability” for their
nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) and to defend against
strikes on their homeland. The dominant Navy vision, in contrast, had been of
Soviet submarines flooding the Atlantic to sink U.S. shipping bound for Europe,
as the Germans had done in World War II.25 Sensitive intelligence was now confirming the center’s findings. The new Delta class of Soviet SSBNs, armed with
SS-N-8 missiles, had the range to reach American targets from bastions in Arctic
waters rather than having to transit into the Atlantic, as SSBNs of the previous
classes had to do. The bulk of the Soviet Northern Fleet would be north of the
Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom gap.
The SSG also was aware of the Soviet emphasis on calculating “correlation of
forces” to assess whether the Soviet Union had sufficient forces to succeed in an
operation, including nuclear war fighting.26 Changing the Soviet perception of
the correlation of forces in NATO’s favor—in the maritime theaters, so as to require the USSR to devote forces to defense early in a conflict, and also in nuclear
forces, and rapidly, so as to deter escalation to the use of nuclear weapons by
either side—set the strategic intent for the SSG.
From discussions with the unified commands early in its year of study, the
first SSG quickly learned that the United States had no coherent global strategy
for fighting the Soviets. Each theater commander was operating on a different
timeline.27 From discussions at the headquarters of Supreme Allied Commander
Europe, the SSG knew that its commander, then General Bernard Rogers, believed that he would have to resort to nuclear weapons within days of a Soviet
invasion of Western Europe.28 U.S. Navy war plans of the 1970s called for breaking contact with the Soviets as they extended their defensive perimeter with (in
the antiaccess/area-denial approach of the day) naval aviation and surface forces
armed with cruise missiles, falling back and later, over time, fighting back toward
the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, the United States had a huge advantage in antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) over the Soviets. In 1949, facing demobilization, the U.S. submarine force
had adopted ASW as a new mission, establishing Submarine Development Group
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/4
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2 to develop required capabilities. Over two decades of close cooperation with
Navy laboratories and intelligence, the group had developed tactics for emerging technologies through rigorous scientific analysis of submarine exercises. The
submarine force had gone from having essentially no ASW capability to being the
Navy’s premier ASW capability.29
The SSG’s campaign approach called for using combined-arms antisubmarine
operations to exploit that advantage further. Plans at the time called for maritime patrol aircraft, carrier battle groups, surface action groups, and submarines
to operate independently in
A renewed focus on war-fighting strategy and separate areas. Taking a page
from U.S. Army concepts of
operations might dust off some old SSG concombined arms and using
cepts while focusing on the development of
lessons from the Navy’s Conew ones.
ordination in Direct Support
program, the SSG developed concepts for ASW forces working as integrated
teams.30 Analysis indicated that the primary U.S. submarine losses would be from
counterfire (i.e., weapons fired in immediate response to torpedo launches—the
United States had the quietest submarines and noisiest torpedoes in the world)
and mines. Having maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters from surface ships
conduct the attacks would not only reduce submarine losses but accelerate attack
rates, by preserving the most effective sensors and preventing submarines from
having to withdraw to reload their tubes. Combined arms offered the prospect
of higher Soviet SSBN-loss rates at the onset of conflict than did independent
ASW operations, a differential that would affect the nuclear correlation of forces
within days.
To allow the maritime patrol aircraft to operate forward, the submarines
needed to sink the Soviet navy ships that carried antiaircraft missiles. The Soviets had about fifteen such ships available in their Northern Fleet. They operated
them in surface action groups arrayed to provide defense for their SSBNs and
against air strikes against their homeland. To target these surface action groups,
the SSG’s concept called for U.S./NATO Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) aircraft operating in a maritime mode to provide location data to the
submarines, using digital data links (Link 11). To achieve the intended strategic
effect, the intent was to sink the key Soviet air-defense ships in the first days of
the war, rapidly expanding the area in which combined-arms ASW could be conducted. The AWACS could then return to their role in the air battle over Norway.
Sinking the Soviet air-defense ships would have another effect on the nuclear
correlation of forces. The Soviet surface action groups operated where U.S.
bombers planned to refuel on their paths from the United States to Moscow.
Sinking these ships rolled back the Soviet defenses against both aircraft carrier
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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and intercontinental bomber strikes toward the heart of the Soviet Union, placing
greater pressure on national air-defense forces (Voyska PVO Strany).
To be in position at the outset, U.S. submarines and maritime patrol aircraft
would have to move quickly. The SSG used intelligence on Soviet fleet readiness
to lay out U.S. and Soviet timelines for deploying forces to station. Detailed analysis of the Northern Fleet battle and war gaming of all the maritime theaters indicated rates at which to expect Soviet and American losses. Intelligence officers
with access to the latest assessments played the “Red” teams in the war games,
employing their best understanding of Soviet plans and operations.
As with the war at sea, the SSG carefully analyzed the air war over northern
Norway and gamed the air war in the maritime theaters. The Soviets organized
their forces within “theaters of military operations,” each with its own command
and assigned forces.31 The primary mission of Soviet Naval Air Force (SNA) Bear
and Backfire bombers in the Northwestern, Southwestern, and Far East Theaters
was to prevent strikes by U.S./NATO naval forces on Soviet forces and territory.
The SSG’s appreciation was that the SNA had two possible routes for attacking
U.S. carrier battle groups coming from the Atlantic. They either could go around
the North Cape of Norway, as they did during routine training and surveillance
flights, or test Swedish neutrality by flying over Sweden. The latter risked adding
the very capable Swedish air defenses to those NATO had deployed. Gaining air
control over northern Norway would increase Northwestern Theater SNA losses
should they fly over or close to land, significantly reduce the range at which they
could attack U.S./NATO naval forces, and similarly limit attacks on Iceland.
Campaign analysis and gaming indicated that U.S. naval air, working with
the NATO forces assigned to the northern region, could be decisive in gaining
and maintaining air control over northern Norway. Furthermore, maintaining
control over northern Norway provided airfields for strikes against Northwestern
Theater SNA and Voyska PVO Strany bases, further rolling back defenses against
U.S. strategic bombers. The PVO Strany was, and is, a separate branch of air
forces dedicated to defense against air strikes on Soviet and now Russian territory, a structure reflecting the priority placed on defense of the homeland. At that
time, only U.S. naval air had all-weather, nighttime attack capabilities. Marine
expeditionary airfield equipment could be used to expand rapidly the ability of
Norway’s airfields to handle military jets. The SSG envisioned using these fields
in a manner similar to that in which Henderson Field on Guadalcanal was occasionally used in World War II—that is, to extend the range of carrier-based air
strikes by recovering, refueling, and rearming aircraft.
The key to effective, coordinated air operations over northern Norway was
creating the means to share information between the NATO Air Defense Ground
Environment command-and-control system and U.S./NATO naval data links
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/4
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(Link 4 and Link 11). Since only the Marines worked regularly with sea/air/
ground forces, only a Marine “tactical operations center” had all the networks
needed for the desired coordination. The Marine Corps prepositioning plan in
Norway included a tactical operations center.
Combined-arms ASW and networking the U.S./NATO sea-, air-, and groundsurveillance and command systems were at the core of the SSG’s operational
concepts, designed to allow the Navy to fight forward, negate Soviet combat stability, and change both the conventional and nuclear correlations of forces. This
was the SSG’s alternative to losing in the center and falling back on the flanks.
Bill Owens would later frequently recall that his year on the SSG had been an
epiphany—beginning with the perspective of a submariner, he had quickly come
to appreciate the power that could come from integrating the advantages of each
Navy branch and military service into a war-fighting whole. As Owens and Art
Cebrowski advanced in their careers, they would continue to refine and expand
on their notions of system of systems and network-centric warfare.
The first SSG departed early in the summer of 1982, and the second SSG convened in August. SSG II picked up where SSG I had left off, focusing on NATO’s
southern flank (the USSR’s Southwestern Theater of Military Operations) and
Northeast Asia (the Soviet Far East Theater) in the way that the first SSG had
focused on the NATO northern and Soviet Northwestern theaters. Its members
followed the SSG template of visiting senior commanders and strategists and
analyzing and gaming their concepts. The team working on the Pacific included
officers who had participated in Admiral Hayward’s Sea Strike concepts when
he commanded the Pacific Fleet. The Mediterranean team came from command
of ships recently deployed there. Recalling how Soviet T-34 tanks arriving from
the Far East Theater had saved Moscow in World War II, Sea Strike planners
intended to use naval forces to prevent Soviet far-eastern forces from moving
west.32 The team working the Mediterranean also focused on pressing the Soviet
correlation of forces in the Southwestern Theater and targeting the few available Soviet / Warsaw Pact lines of communication that would support an attack
on NATO’s south.
SSG II added two significant refinements to the work of the previous year.
One was the concept of “havens.” SNA bombers had to lock their cruise missiles
onto their targets before they launched. The SSG, using data on the flight profiles
of the bombers and technical intelligence on Soviet cruise missiles, adopted a
concept from a paper by a former amphibious-squadron commander at the Naval
War College to use the islands of the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean to prevent the SNA from targeting carriers or their escorts with cruise missiles. Though
islands are sparse in the western Pacific, the concept offered opportunities there
also. The fjords of Norway were well suited to this tactic.
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The second refinement was teaming with the U.S. Air Force, which had the
best low-altitude models for penetrating Soviet air defenses. Using these models,
the SSG focused its efforts on “targets that count,” in terms of limiting the effectiveness of Soviet air forces and the ability of the Warsaw Pact to move large
ground formations along the limited land lines of communications supporting
the maritime theaters. The “targets that count” approach evolved into a Joint
Warfare Analysis Center, focusing on “effects-based operations.”33
The strategy called for close Air Force / Navy cooperation in the Pacific theater.
The distances involved in the conduct of strikes demanded extensive in-flight
refueling for carrier-based aircraft. Also, B-52s played a large role in a planned
mining campaign. In addition to being the origin of network-centric warfare, the
SSG’s maritime strategy was in effect “Air-Sea Battle 1.0.”
IMPLEMENTING THE SSG MARITIME STRATEGY
To meet Admiral Hayward’s aims as CNO to stimulate strategic discourse within
the Navy leadership, he encouraged the SSG to meet with as many flag officers
as it could. “In many ways, the Strategic Studies Group acted like a small swarm
of honeybees, migrating from one flag officer to another, discussing issues, exchanging views, and carrying the pollen of stimulating thought from one widely
separated command to another.”34 By the end of their year at the Center for Naval
Warfare Studies, Owens and Cebrowski had briefed 162 flag officers.35 A key briefing came in October 1982, when they were invited back to present their ideas to
Admiral James D. Watkins, the new CNO, at his first Navy “four-star” conference
—that is, with the Navy’s four-star admirals and the Navy Staff ’s three-stars attending. The briefing, scheduled for forty-five minutes at the end of the day, went
on for almost six hours; Admiral William J. Crowe (Commander in Chief, U.S.
Forces Pacific, later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) continued the conversation afterward with Art Cebrowski, using a chart on the hood of his car. By
1983 the first SSG concepts were being reflected in revised Navy war plans and
the CNO had signed a memorandum of understanding with the Chief of Staff of
the Air Force to work jointly on the concepts contained in the maritime strategy.36
War gaming involving admirals in operational and staff commands and senior
representatives from other services became a very effective mechanism for familiarizing those outside the SSG with its concepts even as it was refining them. The
SSG conducted games every few months to explore its concepts, and its members
served as theater commanders in the Naval War College’s annual Global War
Game. As the Global War Game series matured, flag and general officers from
the theater commands came to play their forces, and other services brought their
campaign models to adjudicate game outcomes.
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Following their respective years in the SSG, its fellows were assigned by the
CNO either to positions where they could influence implementation of the strategy or to command. Dan Wolkensdorfer was assigned to develop ASW programs
on the Navy Staff, and Bill Owens became executive assistant to the Director for
Naval Warfare on the Navy Staff, responsible for balancing naval warfare capabilities in Navy programs. Art Cebrowski went immediately to command a carrier air wing. The Center for Naval Warfare Studies staff worked with the Navy
Staff on writing a new formal document, The Maritime Strategy. CNO Fellows
from the SSG also held important positions in Navy policy and served as direct
links to or supervisors of the drafters of the Navy’s Maritime Strategy briefing
and classified booklet and of
The SSG’s approach was to identify strengths
the U.S. Naval Institute Prothat U.S. and allied forces could apply against ceedings supplement about it
Soviet weaknesses in the maritime theaters to (published in January 1986)
attack the Soviet Union’s strategic sensitivities by Admiral Watkins and the
in a global war.
Commandant of the Marine
Corps, P. X. Kelley.
The SSG’s concepts led also to exercises and technology development. When
in command of a submarine squadron, Owens had exchanged an officer with a
nearby maritime patrol aircraft squadron to coordinate exercises by which, at every opportunity for a submarine and P-3 aircraft to operate within range of each
other, clandestine communications for use in forward areas could be developed.
As chief of staff for Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet, Owens had
established an exercise called AGILE PLAYER to get all available submarines out of
port and headed toward their wartime patrol areas within seventy-two hours. By
1985 the Second Fleet had begun exercising the carrier-haven concept in Vestfjord as part of Exercises NORTHERN WEDDING and OCEAN SAFARI. As Commander, Submarine Group 2, Rear Admiral J. D. Williams (who had played in
SSG war games) initiated submarine exercises with AWACS aircraft to work out
tactics and resolve technical glitches in Link 11 communications. Commander,
Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet and the commander of Development Squadron
12 worked with their counterparts in the fleets and other Navy branches to exercise and develop combined-arms ASW.
In March 1986, a large NATO exercise covering the Norwegian Sea and commanded from the Northwood headquarters in the United Kingdom demonstrated the effectiveness of combined-arms ASW. Using Bayesian approaches to
estimate where the adversary submarines were, the NATO force achieved detection rates that exceeded the ability of attack aircraft to sortie in response, reversing the normal constraint in ASW. Against the expectation that the Soviets would
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target fixed command headquarters, in 1988 a combined-arms ASW exercise
demonstrated the ability of a mobile command center deployed to an air base in
Norway to command ASW forces near the North Cape.37 Other fleets conducted
similar exercises, both in national exercises and with allies. In November 1987
during Exercise NORPAC87, the commander of the Third Fleet, Vice Admiral
Diego “Duke” Hernandez, used a series of havens along the Aleutians, to cover
his approach to the Kamchatka Peninsula.38
THE EFFECTS OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY
The work of the SSG added to The Maritime Strategy operational depth and detail
that has not otherwise been achieved in strategy documents coming from the
Pentagon. These efforts rapidly changed the Navy’s narrative from one of handwringing over the growing advantages of the Soviet navy to a belief that it could
make a decisive difference in the maritime theaters and create conditions that
could lead to war termination on conditions acceptable to NATO and without the
use of nuclear weapons.39 The exercises with allies—particularly Japan, Norway,
and Turkey—not only developed confidence within the U.S. Navy that it could
fight forward but demonstrated its intent and increased allied confidence in
American support in the event of war, thereby contributing to alliance cohesion
and to deterrence.40 The emphasis on forward operations played to the Soviets’
concern for protecting their naval bastions and the homeland against strikes
from aircraft carriers and cruise missiles, reinforcing their instincts to keep the
bulk of their naval forces near home waters rather than interdicting reinforcements to NATO and Pacific allies. Following the demise of the Soviet Union,
Russian naval leaders were mistakenly to infer that the next U.S. Navy capstone
document—Forward . . . From the Sea—meant that the United States felt that it
no longer had to worry about the Russian navy but could sail up to the coast and
attack from there.41
Even at the time, the maritime strategy sparked a vigorous debate in the West
among academics and former government officials.42 “By the end of 1986, the
public and professional discussion of the issues surrounding The Maritime Strategy had taken a sophisticated form. The issues of naval strategy could be, and were,
understood and being debated widely. This contrasted starkly with the absence of
such discussion a decade earlier, and at the same time, seemed to demonstrate a
widespread appreciation of strategy within the officer corps.”43
Following the end of the Cold War, Owens’s appreciation for the power of
combined arms, as opposed to forces operating independently, as well as his
conviction that networking all service and allied intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities into a system of systems could lead to a decisive information advantage over adversaries, was to govern his actions.44 As
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commander of the Sixth Fleet, he exchanged officers with Army and Air Force
counterparts in an effort to bring joint capabilities into the exercises he oversaw.
As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he made every effort to ensure
that service ISR capabilities were interoperable. Similarly, Art Cebrowski was to
develop the “brand” of “network-centric warfare” and to refine its concepts in his
positions as Director for Command, Control and Communications on the Joint
Staff and as President of the Naval War College, contributing to a rapid growth
in military network capabilities.
IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has replaced the Soviet military as the
most challenging for U.S. forces in the vicinity of its homeland. The strategic
relationship of the United States with China differs in important ways from that
with the Soviets. On the national level, rather than containing the Chinese, the
United States encourages them to promote security and peaceful development
that benefits China’s rise, while deterring its use of armed coercion or aggression
to settle territorial claims and other disputes.45 The competition with the Soviets
was perceived largely as a zero-sum game, wherein any advance for the Soviets
was a loss for the free world—though all would lose massively in a large-scale
war. The game with the Chinese, in contrast, is one in which both sides win big
or lose big.
The overall military concept for deterring the Chinese is similar to that embodied in The Overall Strategic Concept for Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Area, or MC 14/3.46 The overall concept is defensive. The United
States has no intention or reason to initiate armed conflict. Its intent is to provide for security and peaceful development by credible deterrence, effected by
working with the nations of the region and leading the Chinese to conclude that
if they launched an armed attack on the United States or its allies the chances of
a favorable decision to them are too small to be acceptable, and that fatal risks
could be involved. The overall military concept, rather, is a balance of deterrence
and encouragement, inviting the PLA to play a responsible and constructive role
in promoting security and peaceful development and join in coalition operations,
as it has in countering piracy in the Indian Ocean. Underpinning this concept
is the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), analysis for which began in
2008.47 “High-end asymmetric threats,” presented mainly by the PLA, were the
focus of much of that analysis.48
Within the Pentagon today, the last decade of double-digit growth in Chinese
military expenditures and increasing Iranian military sophistication, largely
focused on U.S. forces moving to and within the nearby theaters, has led to another period of hand-wringing. Iran’s capabilities are much more limited in scale,
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geographic scope, and forces than are China’s, but they are potent in the restricted
waters near shore and against bases in nearby countries. The Pentagon’s approach
to programming future forces centers principally on capability shortfalls created
by adversary militaries, rather than creating concerns among adversaries regarding their own military capabilities against U.S. forces. The Pentagon, stimulated
by Congress and the defense industry, turns to superior technology (the means)
rather than to strategy (the
ways) to accomplish its deIn the early 1980s the Navy came to believe
sired ends. Reacting to what
that it could play a decisive role in a global
the PLA and other military
war with the Soviet Union.
forces are doing cedes the
initiative to them at a time when technology is rapidly shared and copied around
the globe and the U.S. military budget is declining.
In July 2009, in a constructive effort to redirect somewhat this unproductive
approach, the Secretary of Defense, with strong support from Navy and Air Force
leadership, initiated an Air-Sea Battle effort to address concerns raised in the
QDR. The initiative recalls the Air Force / Navy cooperation engendered by the
1983 memorandum of understanding.49 The Air-Sea Battle is not a strategy but a
concept “to better integrate the Services in new and creative ways.”50 War-fighting
strategies as such are the responsibility of the combatant commanders, not the
services. The Air-Sea Battle concept concentrates on identifying cost-effective
methods for disrupting “effects chains” in an adversary’s processes of command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, ideally precluding attacks on friendly forces; on destroying or neutralizing
adversary weapon platforms to enhance friendly survivability and provide freedom of action; and on defeating weapons that have been launched so as to defend
friendly forces and allow sustained operations.51
However, a declared design to “attack in depth” has triggered a vigorous debate
over the escalatory potential of Air-Sea Battle and how it fits into a strategy for
war with China.52 T. X. Hammes has offered an “offshore control strategy” that
eschews any strikes on the mainland, calling instead for a long-duration blockade
to cripple the Chinese economy.53 Similarly, Wayne Hughes and Jeffrey Kline
have argued for a war-at-sea strategy involving blockade and destruction of PLA
forces at sea without strikes on the mainland, thus reducing possibilities of escalation.54 David Gompert and Terrence Kelly too have argued for greater emphasis
on defensive measures, to include giving antiaccess/area-denial capabilities to
allies in Asia to deny the Chinese the use of the seas.55
These concepts and strategies differ in their judgments on the feasibility and
wisdom of strikes on the Chinese mainland, but all aim to align program planning and budgeting for future force development rather than to provide strategy
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and concepts for winning a war using forces and capabilities that could be available in months. To the extent that these proposed concepts and strategies require
future investment for success, their credibility is suspect in today’s budget environment. Also, given current international dynamics, the security situation may
change significantly in the decade or two that would be required to procure the
force structures envisioned by these concepts and strategies. Both factors suggest putting more effort into developing strategic and operational concepts for
prevailing with today’s forces to effect credible deterrence and reassure allies. The
public debate is useful. However, more important would be a declaratory strategy
that is effective in a long-term competition with the PLA, supported by a military
strategy in which American leadership and military officers have confidence.
The military operational challenge posed by the PLA is similar to that which
the Soviet military presented in the early 1980s. The SSG addressed the latter
by focusing on Soviet military strategy, Soviet concepts of war fighting, Soviet
sensitivities and vulnerabilities, and command and bureaucratic structures that
affected Soviet decisions and operations, in addition to details of Soviet military
technology. A similar effort would carefully investigate the perspectives of Beijing and PLA regional and local commands; it would emphasize PLA military
science, strategic concepts, campaign theories, and command and operational
practices, so as to take advantage of Chinese and PLA sensitivities and theories of
victory. Such Chinese concepts as “victory of form” (winning without fighting),
“shi” (psychological momentum using both strength and deception), force groupings, command arrangements, and the importance of the Second Artillery as a
special branch analogous to the Voyska PVO Strany should play into new strategic concepts. While the Second Artillery has responsibilities for intercontinental
nuclear strike, the effectiveness of missiles generally is central to PLA theories of
victory and warrants particular attention.
SSG operational concepts in the early 1980s trumped the typical Washington
analysis of technical weapon-system capabilities that suggested the Navy would
be “taking a knife to a gunfight” in a battle with Soviet naval aviation.56 The first
SSG devised approaches for controlling key geography at sea and over land to
limit the SNA’s lines of approach to the U.S. fleet and for extending the range of
U.S. strikes by using expeditionary air bases ashore. SSG II added the concept
of aircraft carrier havens and “targets that count” to compensate for the limited
range and sortie rates of naval strike aircraft.
A renewed focus on war-fighting strategy and operations might dust off some
old SSG concepts while focusing on the development of new ones. All U.S. concepts and strategies exploit the limitations of the PLA’s ASW capabilities. Shortly
following the end of the Cold War the U.S. Navy lost its competence in combinedarms ASW; these capabilities are now receiving renewed attention. Over the last
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decade the value, limitations, and vulnerabilities of network-centric warfare have
been further explored. Electronic warfare has received renewed emphasis, after
being bureaucratically submerged in “information operations” and generally
neglected. Perhaps the most fertile field for concept development is cyber war
fighting, which receives scant attention in most public discourse. New concepts
in these fields should consider investment primarily in payloads that could be
procured in a few years, or months in an emergency, vice platforms, etc., taking
decades to develop and deploy.
In 1985 the CNO, with the urging of Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, assigned a director to the SSG separate from the dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, thereby disconnecting the SSG from the center. In 1995, Admiral
Mike Boorda, as CNO, changed the direction of the SSG to focus on warfare innovation and the “Navy after next.” The current CNO, Jon Greenert, reportedly is
pleased with the work that the SSG is doing for him under its current charter and
approach, and the rate of promotion to flag rank of CNO Fellows has returned
to that of the 1980s. That said, the ingredients that led to the success of the maritime strategy would likely contribute as well to the success of new strategic and
operational concepts. A core of future naval leaders working directly for the CNO
and with the Navy leadership, counterparts from other services, and the relevant
combatant commands; provided with access to special intelligence and programs;
located away from the Pentagon but in an environment where they can think,
experiment with games, and learn; supported by first-rate operational analysis;
focused on war fighting rather than programs and budgets; and assigned thereafter to positions where they can implement the concepts they helped develop
—such a group could again rapidly generate an effective declaratory strategy
underpinned by strategic and operational concepts in which the military and
civilian leadership could have confidence.
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